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PROPOSED CHANGES IN THE LAWS OF FRANCE AS TO FOREIGN
CORPORATIONS.
Foreign moneyed corporations doing business in France have
long been subjected to many inconvenient restrictions. They are
now likely to be subjected to greater ones. A special parliamentary
commission, constituted to consider this general subject, is maturing
a bill to prevent their establishment of branch offices in France except
under strict limitations. From a correspondent of one of the Law
School faculty, information has been received that the measures
reported will probably embrace the following features:
I. No branch office can be opened except permission be first
given by a public decree, or is guaranteed by treaty.
2. None can be established without first filing with the clerk of
the Tribunal of Commerce, and also publishing in the official jour-
nals, full details as to the proposed site, and the charter of the
corporation, and its active capital.
3. Contracts made at branch offices established without com-
plying with these rules are void as to third parties.
4. No shares or bonds of such foreign corporations can be
sold (except on execution) without publication of full particulars
as to the financial constitution and condition of the company, the
place of its central office, the rules as to shareholders' meetings, etc.
5. All these provisions apply to companies now existing, as
well as to those that may be hereafter formed.
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6. Heavy fines are provided for violation of the 'statute, the
limit being 20,000 francs.
The enactment of this statute, which seems probable, will prove
highly inconvenient to many American corporations doing business
in France; but its provisions can hardly be regarded as unreasonable
in view of the interests to be protected, and the difficulty, at present
existing, in getting precise and authentic information in any country
as to the corporations of another. The tendency of the times is
to turn on the electric light, wherever and whenever corporate
management is brought in question.
By way of compensation, all foreign corporations legally ex-
isting in their own country are hereafter to have the right to do
ordinary business in France, and to sue in court. This was con-
ceded to British companies in 1862, by a special convention, but
up to this time has not been a general right. S. E. B.
RES JUDICATA AND ESTOPPEL.
There exists among the authorities no little conflict as to whether
the doctrine of res judicata has any actual foundation in that of
estoppel. This question seems to be, in the last analysis, the line
of demarcation between the position taken in Justice Day's opinion
in the case .of Deposit Bank of Frankfort v. Board of Councilmen,
24 Sup. Ct. 154, and that of Chief Justice Fuller's dissenting opinion,
in which Justices .Brewer, Brown and Peckham concur. In this
case city officers were attempting to collect taxes from a bank. The
Hewitt law in Kentucky had been declared by the Franklin County
Circuit Court to constitute an irrevocable contract exempting the
bank from taxation. Then, in an action for the recovery of taxes
of other years than those involved in the present case, between the
sameparties, a Federal court had declared that the question was
res judicata, and that no taxes for any year could be collected.
The original Franklin Circuit Court decision was later reversed by
the highest court of the State, and the view that there was an
irrevocable contract exemption repudiated by the Federal Supreme
Court.
Justice Day's opinion holds that the finding of the Franklin
Circuit Court was conclusive evidence for the Federal court, and
hence that the decision of the Federal court was a reaffirmation of
that of the circuit court in. toto, including the holding that the Hewitt
law was an irrevocable contract. As a logical consequence no taxes
whatever.could be collected, in spite of the fact that it is the settled
law of Kentucky that an adjudication of taxes for one year cannot
be pleaded as an estoppel in suits involving taxes of other years.
The dissenting opinion maintains that the decision of the Federal
court was based upon the doctrine of estoppel; that the board of
councilmen was held to be estopped to deny the -existence of ,the
irrevocable contract, and that nothing further was involved. Hence,
it is argued, the decree could not give to the circuit court decision
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any wider scope than the law of the State allowed, and the estoppel
would not extend to taxes other than those involved in the adjudi-
cated case. If, then, the doctrine of res judicata is not founded
upon that of estoppel, the minority position loses its force.
Blackstone defines estoppel as "where a man hath done some
act or executed some deed which estops or precludes him from
averring anything to the contrary," 3 Bl., Comm., 308, a definition
hardly broad enough to include "estoppel by judgment." This
definition is followed by Stephen, P., 239, but Bouvier, Law. Dict.,
694, and Bispham, Eq. (6th ed.), 398, quoting Bigelow, add words
to include the judgment of a court. Several courts have criticized
the use of the phrase "estoppel by judgment" as confusing and
erroneous, maintaining that estoppel must be by the act of the
parties, and that a judgment can hardly be said to be the act of the
parties, especially when rendered against the party instigating the
litigation. Offutt v. John, 8 Mo. 12o; Kilheffer v. Kerr, 17 S. &
R. (Pa.) 319, 325 ; Ball v. Trenhoin, 45 Fed. 588. In Sargent v. New
Haven Steamboat Co., 65 Conn. Ii6, the court says, "The rule of
res judicata does not rest wholly on the narrow ground of a
technical estoppel, nor on the presumption that the former judgment
was right and just, but on the broad ground of public policy, that
requires a limit to litigation; a curb to the litigiousness of the
obstinate litigant. Like the statute of limitations, it is a rule of
rest."
The doctrine of res judicata was first formulated in the familiar
Duchess of Kingston's Case, 2o How. St. Tr. 538, in terms which
would not necessarily involve the introduction of the principle of
estoppel. "The judgment of a court of concurrent jurisdiction
directly upon the point, is as a plea, a bar, or as evidence, con-
clusive between the parties, upon the same matter, directly in
question in another court." That res judicata is an estoppel is as-
serted in Cheney v. Selman, 71 Ga. 384, and by Chief Justice Shaw
in Sawyer v. Woodbury, 7 Gray (Mass.) 499. A typical definition
of estoppel to include res judicata is found in Burlen v. Shannon,
99 Mass. 200, where the court said, "Estoppel is an admission or
determination under circumstances of such solemnity that the law
will not allow the fact so admitted or established to be afterwards
drawn in question between the same parties or their privies."
Sometimes the distinction has bten taken that the judgment is a
bar to further proceedings upon the- same cause of action, but that
the adjudication upon a particular fact or matter is an estoppel.
Burt v. Sternburgh, 4 Cow. (N. Y.) 562; Caperton v. Schmidt, 26
Cal. 479.
We have here, then, a clean-cut conflict of authority, and it
would be a difficult task to determine on which side the weight
lay. It is to be regretted that the Supreme Court did not expressly
declare their view of this fundamental question.
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THE TAKING OF PRIVATE PROPERTY FOR PRIVATE USE.
Under the general provisions of our State constitutions that
"private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation," it has long been settled that the legislature does
-not possess the power to authorize the taking of private property
for any but a public use. Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill 14o; Coster v.
Tide Water Co., 18 N. J. Eq. 54. The rare cases in which this
rule has been questioned, as in Harvey v. Thomas, io Watts 63, are
among the anomalies of our law. Nor, since the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment, can a State, in the absence of any express
or implied restriction in its constitution, take private property for
a private use. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U. S. 403.
Public policy has demanded that in some cases the legislature should
possess this power, and hence there have been inserted in the con-
stitutions of several States provisions permitting private property
to be taken for certain private uses, such as private ways, drains,
flumes and ditches for agricultural, domestic or sanitary purposes.
Obviously in such cases no question can arise as to the nature of
the use. Downing v. More, 12 Colo. 316. But the validity of
such constitutional provisions has within the past few years been
challeneged as being repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment.
Matter of Tuthill, 163 N. Y. 133.
Aside from peculiar provisions regarding the exercise of the
power of eminent domain embodied in several of the State con-
stitutions, the great point of divergence in the decision has been
in conflicting interpretations of the term "public use." One of
the most frequent illustrations of this has been in the construction
of statutes providing for the condemnation of land for private roads.
The subject has again been presented in the case of Healy Lumber
Co. v. Morris, 74 Pac. 681, recently decided by the Supreme Court
of Washington, in which the court holds unconstitutional a statute
of that State authorizing the condemnation of land for private
logging roads. In this case a sharp distinction is drawn between
the terms "public use" and "public policy," and it is held that the
use for which private property can be taken under the power of
eminent domain "must be either a use by the public, or by some
agency which is quasi public, and not simply a use which may
incidentally or indirectly promote the public interest or general
prosperity of the State." The statute above referred to declared
that the person condemning such right of way should have the
exclusive use thereof, and the decision is believed to represent the
better considered view. Cf. Welton v. Dickson, 38 Neb. 767. On
the other hand, where it is provided that such roads shall be open
to use by the public, such statutes have generally been sustained.
Sherman v. Buick, 32 Cal. 253; Denham v. Bristol County Corn-
mnissioners, io8 Mass. 202. The restricted meaning given to the
term "public use" in Healy Lumber Co. v. Morris, supra, is the
one approved by most text writers, and followed in a number of
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the States, Bloodgood v. Railroad Co., I8 Wend. 9, although in
others it has been construed broadly as synonomous with public
interest, benefit or advantage. Frequently the magnitude of the
interests involved, as the mining industry in Montana, Butte, etc.,
Ry. Co. v. Montana Farmers' Co., 16 Mont. 504, irrigation in
Nebraska, Paxton Co. v. Farmers' Co., 45 Neb. 884, manufacturing
in Connecticut, Ohnstead v. Camp, 33 Conn. 532, has been held to
be a determining factor. On this point the decisions are in hopeless
conflict.
The case of Healy Lumber Co. v. Morris, supra, has an addi-
tional element of interest in that it was decided under a constitution
which permits private property to be taken for certain private uses,
and declares that whenever the power of eminent domain is sought
to be exercised the question of the public character of the use shall
be a judicial question, to be determined as such regardless of
legislative assertion. Among the private uses specified in the con-
stitution for which private property may be taken is included
"private ways of necessity," which the court holds-somewhat
gratuitously-to be simply in affirmance of the common law rule
that a private way of necessity can arise only out of land granted
or reserved by the grantor. Cf. Logan v. Stogsdale, 123 Ind. 372.
In the absence of a constitutional declaration that the public char-
acter of the use shall be primarily a judicial question, it is a general
rule that the courts will construe the use to be public unless it is
manifestly private. Varner v. Martin, 21 W. Va. 534; Chicago.,
etc., Ry. Co. v. Morehouse, 112 Wis. I. The above provision in
the constitution of Washington the court construes as having abol-
ished the general rule and entirely removed the influence of anyjudgment expressed by the legislature.' A similar provision in the
constitution of Missouri has been so interpreted; City of Savannah
v. Hancock, 91 Mo. 54; but in the case of Denver, etc., Co. v. Union
Pacific Ry. Co., 34 Fed. 386, a like provision in the constitution of
Colorado seems to be regarded as merely in affirmance of the general
rule, and that notwithstanding a constitutional declaration that all
railroads shall be deemed public highways, the question as to the
character of a railroad may be raised in a proceeding by it to
condemn land.
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM.
In June, 19o2, the people of Oregon amended article four of
their constitution to read as follows: "Section I. The legislative
authority of the State shall be vested in a legislative assembly, con-
sisting of a Senate and House of Representatives, but the people
'In delivering the opinion of the court, Dunbar, J., states that "an ex-
amination of all the different constitutions in the Union shows that only two
other States. viz: Colorado and Missouri, have this provision of our con-
stitution." The learned judge apparently overlooked the constitution ofMississippi, which contains a similar provision. See Const. Miss., Sec. 17.
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reserve to themselves power to propose laws and amendments to the
constitution and to enact or reject the same at the polls, independent
of the legislative assembly, and also reserve power at their own
option to approve or reject at the polls any act of the legislative
assembly." The amendment proceeds to state the per cent. of
the legal voters required to propose and the manner of proposing
any measure in the exercise of the power of initiative, and the per
cent. required and the manner of setting in motion the power of
referendum. In the recent case of Kadderly v. City of Portland,
74 Pac. 710, in the supreme court of the State, the amendment was
attacked on the ground that it violated section four, article four,
of the Constitution of the United States, guaranteeing to every State
a republican form of government. By the reservation of the two
powers of this amendment it is possible for the people to exercise
directly the functions of government to the exclusion of the general
assembly. Is this opposed to our notion of a republican form of
government? In construing the clause of guaranty it is essential
that we look to that epoch of our history from which we must
derive our definition of a republic.
At the close of the Revolution the State governments under
which the constitution was ratified were not arbitrary institutions;
they recognized ancient customs and the old forms of polity. They
had united with these forms of polity the freedom of a new world.
Religious liberty was the prime motive that brought the early settlers
to America. They had enjoyed civil liberty in England. What
we may call a constitutional liberty had been yielded to the people
several centuries before by reason of the Crown's finding it neces-
sary to obtain the support of a popular body to successfully oppose
the feudal barons in the hereditary House of Lords. The burgesses
thus became the guardians of the people's rights. It is a mistaken
idea that this liberty had its origin in any right conceded as be-
longing to the people themselves. Political liberty was an insti-
tution of the colonists own construction. At the general convention
of all the planters, assembled at Hartford, June I4 th., 1639, in-
dividual rights were in part surrendered, with the formation of a
written constitution, that in the remainder the colonists might be
more secure.
The early constitution of Connecticut recognized the doctrine
that all ultimate power is with the people. It gave legislative power
to the gbneral court of magistrates, but it provided alpo that the
people themselves might exercise the power of legislation directly.
Article io read as follows: "It is ordered, sentenced and decreed
that every General Court, except such as through neglect of the
Governor and the greater part of Magistrates the Freemen them-
selves do call, shall consist of the Governor, or someone chosen to
moderate the Court, and four other Magistrates at least, with the
major part of the deputies of the several Towns legally chosen;
and in case the Freemen or major part of them, through neglect
or refusal of the Governor and major part of the Magistrates, shall
call a Court, it shall consist of the major part of Freemen that are
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present or their deputies with a Moderator chosen by them. In
which said General Courts shall consist the supreme power of the
Commonwealth, * * * "1 The charter of 1661, granted by
Charles II at the request of the colonists, did not disturb the
system by which they governed themselves. These charters were
allowed and not enacted by the sovereign power. So strictly demo-
cratic were the republics of Rhode Island and Connecticut that
their laws were not subject to be negatived by the king; in fact,
instances were frequent where the colonists disregarded the declara-
tions of the king in council against them.2  There was thus no
need to change their form of government when the union with
England was dissolved. Similarly the ratification of the Federal
Constitution called for no change of the established principles. It
was the Connecticut idea of a republic that spread through the
thirteen States. Although the clause of guaranty was proposed
by Randolph of Virginia, it is certain that for a definition of the
term "republic," the framers looked to New England. From the
above article of the Connecticut Constitution it appears that the
"Freemen" were to exercise legislative power only in case of
neglect or refusal on the part of the Governor and Magistrates to
assemble; but it is equally evident that the Court was merely an
instrument of the people, and with or without that Court the
functions of government were to be continued. It was the intention
of the colonists to have government administered by chosen repre-
sentatives or by laws enacted in popular assembly.
The initiative and referendum amendment to the constitution
of Oregon may be impracticable, although it is to be used but con-
currently, for people collectively are extremely incapable of properly
discussing matters of legislation.' It may be dangerous. "The
great secret of preserving liberty is to lodge the supreme power so
as to be well supported and not abused." 4 However unwise the
act might appear in the light of modern conditions it is clear that
it is more in harmony with, than against, the forms of republican
government guaranteed to the States by the Federal Constitution.
LEGAL STATUS OF THE INDIANS-VALIDITY OF INDIAN MARRIAGES.
The legal relationship that exists between the United States
government and the tribal Indians within its jurisdiction is difficult
of precise description. That the Indians have been regarded from
an early period in our national life as wards of the nation is perhaps
generally known, but, nevertheless, that relationship has as long
been looked upon as anomolous and as only approximating more
nearly to that of guardian and ward than to that of any other legal
'Trumbull's Colonial Records, I. 20.
'North .American Review (1844), 376.
"Montesquieu, Spirit of Laws, I40, 192.
'Gov. Huntington in Connecticut Convention on the adoption of the U. S.Constitution.
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status. Chief Justice Marshall in an early case said: "The relation
of the Indians to the United States is marked by peculiar and cardi-
nal distinctions which exist nowhere else. * * * It may well be
doubted whether those tribes which reside within the acknowledged
boundaries of the United States can with strict accuracy be de-
nominated foreign nations. * * * They may more correctly be
denominated domestic dependent nations. They are in a state of
pupilage. Their relation to the United States resembles that of
guardian and ward. They look to our government for protection
and rely upon its kindness and power." Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 5 Peters i. By recognizing a tribe of Indians as a
"nation" that is "domestic" and "dependent" and" in a state of
pupilage" it is at once apparent how anomolous is their condition.
As a "nation" the attributes of sovereignty are implied, while as a
dependent ward in a state of pupilage the suzerainty of the federal
government is acknowledged. The United States, however, con-
tinued to regard the Indians as nations and made treaties with them
as such until 1871, when after an hundred years of the treaty
making system of government a new departure was taken in gov-
erning them by acts of Congress. The U. S. Rev. Stat., sec. 2079,
1871, provide in substance that from that date no Indian tribe or
nation shall be recognized or acknowledged as an independent
nation with whom the United States may contract a treaty.
A recognition of the former idea of nationalism in the Indians
as well as paternalism in the federal government was shown recently
in Oregon, whose Supreme Court held that, although an act of
Congress made Indians receiving allotments of land in severalty
citizens of the United States subject to the laws of the State
in which they live, and although a later congressional act made the
State law of alienation and descent applicable to such allotments, yet
the issue of the male and female Indian who cohabited as husband
and wife according to the custom of Indian life was deemed legiti-
mate to determine the descent of the land. Kalyton v. Kalyton, 74
Pac. 491, Oregon. The court regarded "a quasi tribal relation"
as subsisting in the tribe of which the parties were members and
that as a consequence the State laws were inapplicable. On the
theory that "marriages valid where made are valid everywhere,"
the courts have uniformly recognized marriages among Indians re-
taining their tribal character. Wall v. Williamson, 8 Ala. 184;
Earl v. Godley, 42 Minn. 361; La Revierre v'. La Revierre, 77 Mo.
512. The doctrine has even been extended to include polygamous
marriages among the Indians. Kobogum v. Jackson, 76 Mich. 498.
The validity of such marriages proceeds upon the tacit admission
that while tribal Indians are not nations nor possessed of the full
attributes of sovereignty, yet they are a separate people or "political
community" with the power of regulating their internal and social
relations. Vide U. S. v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375. The United
States courts and the State courts have alike adopted as law that
no State laws have any force over Indians when they live together
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as a tribe. Kansas Indians, 5 Wall. 737; Hastings v. Farmer, 4 N.
Y. 293. They are, in fact, wards of the nation and both their
personal and property rights are under the immediate protection
and control of Congress. U. S. v. Thomas, 151 U. S. 577. As
to the land which they occupy in their collective capacity they have
only a possessory right of occupancy and subject to this right the
United States may dispose of the fee; Buttz v. Railroad, 119 U. S.
55; but the right of the Indians to their occupancy is as sacred as
that of the United States to the fee. Leavenworth v. Railroed, 92
U. S. 733. An exception to this general policy obtains with
reference to certain tribes in the Indian territory, commonly known
as "the five civilized nations," to whom the fee has been conveyed
by treaty with the limitation that the lands shall revert to the United
States if the Indians become extinct or abandon the same. Vide
Keokuk v. Ulam, 4 Okla. 5. Moreover, Congress has provided
that the legislative enactments and judicial proceedings of these
more advanced Indians shall be entitled to the same faith and
credit as those of the territories. 26 Stat. at L., 93, secs. 29-37.
Individually, the Indian is not a citizen of the United States.
He cannot become such as long as he remains a member of a tribe,
McKay v. Campbell, 2 Sawy. 118, nor is his status changed by
abandoning his tribal relation unless the government, his guardian,
consents. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U. S. 94. It was formerly held that he
was not a "white person" within the naturalization laws, Re Camille,
6 Sawy. 541, but that rule has been changed by recent statutes,
26 Stat. at Large, 99, and Indians who are taxed or who have
abandoned their tribes may become naturalized citizens. U. S. v.
Elm, Fed. Cases No. 15,o48; Ex parte Kenyon, 5 Dill. 385.
The trend of legislation and adjudication, it will be observed, is
to eradicate the notion that the Indians, whether regarded individ-
ually or collectively, are to be considered "not as citizens but as
domestic subjects." 7 Op. Att'y.-Gen., 756. The congressional
measures of 1871, which prohibited their further recognition as
nations and the later provision allowing them to become naturalized
are alike evidence of the wiping out of their once anamolous relation
and of placing them more nearly, if not quite, on the same footing
as other persons. In short, the tendency is to amalgamate them
with the people of the United States.
